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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
ROBERT REEDY, JR. 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 18082 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Robert Reedy, Jr., appeals from a conviction 
and judgment of Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the Second Degree, 
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Robert Reedy, Jr. was charged with Aggravated 
Robbery, a felony of the First Degree in violation of Title 
76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended). 
Appellant was convicted as charged in a jury trial and was sentenced 
to incarceration at the Utah State Prison pursuant to Title 
76, Chapter 3, Section 402, Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended), 
for the indeterminate term as provided by law for a felony of 
the Second-Degree. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have the conviction and judgment 
rendered below reversed and to have the case remanded to the 
Third Judicial District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 28, 1980, between 8:15 and 8:30 a.m. two men 
approached John Palmer, an attendant at a service station located 
at 200 West on 1300 South. (T. 9-10) They asked for change 
for a dollar and went to the coke machine. (T. 10-11) The 
two returned to the cashier's window and pointed a gun through 
the face hole at Mr. Palmer and demanded the money from the 
till. (T. 11) On July 10, 1980, Mr. Palmer identified a photograph 
of the appellant as the person who held the gun during the course 
of the robbery. (T. 16, 37-38) However, no identification 
of the appellant was made in court by Mr. Palmer. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CO:MMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
REFUSING TO GIVE THE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION ON THE NATURE OF AND REQUIREMENTS 
FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE. 
The defense raised at trial was that the appellant was 
not the person who committed the aggravated robbery which was 
alleged in the Information. The only identification made of 
the a?µellant by Mr. Palmer was from a photograohic array nearly 
two weeks after the incident. As a oart of his defense, appellant 
requested an instruction which described the nature and dangers 
inherent in identification evidence, some factors to consider in 
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assessing the value of identification evidence and the burden 
of proof with respect to the defense. (R. 66-67) 1 . 
1. That Instruction provided: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness. In this case its value depends on 
the opportunity the witness had to observe whether or-not the 
defendant was the person who committed the aggravated robbery of 
John Glen Palmer on June 28," 1980, and to make a reliable identification 
later. 
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you 
should consider the following: 
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and an 
adequate opportunity to observe the of fender? 
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the 
person at the time will be affected by such matters as how long or 
short a time was available, how far or close the witness was from the 
offender, how good were lighting conditions, whether the witness had 
had occasion to see or know the person in the past .. 
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by that 
witness subsequent to the event was A. nroduct of his or her own 
recollection? - You may take into account both the strength of the 
identification, and the circumstances under which the identification 
was made. 
If the identification by the witness may have been influenced by 
the circumstances under which the defendant was Presented to him for 
identification, you should scrutinize the identification with great 
care. You may also consider the length of time that lapsed between 
the occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity of the witness to 
see defendant, as a factor bea~ing on the realiability of the 
identification. 
(3) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each 
identification witness in the same way as any other witness, consider 
whether he is truthful, and consider whether he had the capacity and 
opportunity to make a realiable observation on the matter covered in 
his testimony. 
The burden of proof on the State extends to every element of 
the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is such an element. 
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Robert Reedy, Jr., 
was the pernetrator of the offense in question in this case. If 
after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as to the 
accuracy of the· identification, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
(R. 66-67). 
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The trial court refused to give the instruction and exception 
was taken. (Supplemental Transcript p. 3) 
The dangers inherent in eyewitness identification evidence 
have been the subject of discussion for many years. In an oft-
quoted passage, the late Felix Frankfurter, former United States 
Supreme Court Justice observed: 
What is the worth of identification testimony 
even when uncontradicted? The identification of 
strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards 
of such testimony are established by a formidable 
number of instances in the records of English and 
American trials. These instances are recent --
not due to the brutalities of ancient criminal 
procedure. . .. 
Evidence as to identity based on personal 
impressions, however bona fide, is perhaps of all 
classes of evidence the least to be relied upon, 
and therefore, unless supported by other facts, 
an unsafe basis. for the verdict of a jury. Frankfurter, 
The Trial of Sacco and Vanzetti. 
The unreliability of eyewitness identification has been 
well documented in the literature, and numerous law review articles 
h b . h b. . 2 ave een written on t e su Ject in recent years. The commentators 
of Eyewitness Identi ication, 2 Stan. L. 
Rev. 969 (1977); Due Process Standards for the Admissibilit 
of Eyewitness Identi ication Evi ence, 2 Kan. L. Rev. ( 978); 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Flaws and Defenses, 7 No. 
Ky. L. Rev. 407 (1980); Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental 
Studies of Face Identification 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977); 
Use of E ewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 
Crim. L.Q. 3 ( 97). Lotus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979); 
Public Defender Sourcebook, pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, ed. 1976); 
Yarmey, The Ps cho1o of E ewitness Testimon (1979); Buckhout, 
Determinants o E ewitness Per ormance on a Lineu , 1974 Bull. 
Psychonomic Soc y 9 ; Buckhout, Eyewitness I entication and 
Ps~chology in the Courtroom, Crim. Def., Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 
5- ; Buckhout, Eyewintess Testimony, Scientific Am., Dec. 1974, 
at 23; Ellis, Davies & Shephera, Experimental Studies of Face 
Identification, Nat'l J. Crim. Def. 219 (l977); Levine & Tapp, 
The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade 
to Kirbv, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1079 (1973); Luce, The Ne~lP~ro~ 
r::.:-. .... , 
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note that reasons for this unreliability are found in the problems 
that are associated with human perception and memory, both of 
which play a vital role in eyewitness identification. A lengthy 
discussion of those problems are found in a law review article 
dealing with the problemsi of perception and memory which are 
associated with hearsay testimony. 3 With respect to those issues 
the author noted: 
At a basic level, perception is determined 
by objective structural factors such as the nature 
of the stimulus, the impact of the stimulus on 
the sense organs according to various physical 
laws, the operation of the afferent neural pathways 
from the sense organs to the brain, and the cortical 
projection or reconstruction of the stimulus. However, 
the neurological system operates to transduce physical 
energy into a sensation, it is clear that interpretation 
is required to transform sensation into meaning. 
* * 
In organizing raw sensory input, the central 
nervous system is not a photographic recorder . 
. . . Injury, pathology, drugs, youth, and senility 
can seriously impair the accuracy of these processes. 
1970 Utah Law Rev. at 9. 
In United States v. Barber, 412 F.2d 517 (3rd Ci~. 1971), 
the court gave a similar description of the processes involved 
in human observation, perception and memory. It then went on 
to state, with respect to eyewitness identification, 
2. (continued) Dimension in Eyewitness Identificat~on, Crim. 
Def., May-June 1977, at 5-8; Tyrrell & Cunningham, Eyewitness 
Credibility: Adjusting the Sights of the Judiciary, 37 Ala. 
Law. 563, 575-85 (1976). 
3. Stewart, Perception, Memory and Hearsay: A Criticisra of 
Present Law and the Pronosed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 
Utah Law Rev. 1. 
-5-
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Eyewitness identification testimony, therefore, 
is an expression of a belief or impression by the 
witness. If there is a high degree of precision 
and certai~ty in his expression, which is consistent 
with any prior statements and unshaken on cross-
examination, the statement of the witness may be 
regarded as a statement of fact. If certainty 
is lacking, the expression is deemed to possess 
an evidentiary quality of inferior rank. Thus, 
where the circumstances surroudning the criminal 
act gave limited opportunity for observation or 
utilization of the sensory perception, or where 
uncertainty is expressed by the witness himself, 
or exposed by a past history of the witness' statements 
or demonstrated by cross-examination, the statement 
of identity should be considered as only an expression 
of opinion and should be accompanied by appropriate 
instructions as to its sufficiency and weight. 
To be sure, the courts have been generous in the 
admission of eyewitness identification in order 
to permit the jury to make its own assessment. 
The emphasis has been on inclusion of evidence, 
rather than exclusion; on credibility, rather than 
admissibility. [footnotes omitted] 412 F.2d at 
527. 
In this case, the only identification evidence that was 
produced was that of the appellant's photogra?h being picked 
out of a group of six pictures. This identification did not 
occur until nearly twelve days after the robbery occurred. In 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the United States 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a photographic 
array was impermissibly suggestive in violation of the petitioner's 
right to Due Process of Law. In doing so, the court discussed 
the dangers associated with the use of photographic identifications, 
stating, 
It must be recognized that improper employment 
of photographs by police may sometimes cause witnesses 
to err in identifying criminals. A witness may 
have obtained only a brief glimpse of a criminal, 
or may have seen him under poor conditions. Even 
if the ?Olice subsequently follow the most correct 
photo~raphic identification procedures and show 
him the pictures of a nuo.ber of individuals without 
indicating whom they suspect, there is some danger 
that the witness may make an incorrect ino~r~~~--~· Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This danger will be increased if the police desplay 
to the witness only the picture of a single individual 
who generally resembles the person he saw, or if 
th:y show him the pictures of several persons among 
which the photograph of a single such individual 
recurs or is in some way emphasized. [footnote 
omitted] 390 U.S. at 383. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in State v. Warren, 635 
P.2d 1263 (Kan. 1981), discussed those general problems at length 
which are associated with the use of evewitr.ess identification evidence . 
.I 
. 
The court then took note of the particular problems that arise 
in the courtroom with .that evidence. 
In spite of the great volume of articles on 
the subject of eyewitness testimony by legal writers 
and the great deal of scientific research by psychologists 
in recent years, the courts in this country have 
been slow to take the problem seriously and, until 
recently, have not taken effective steps to confront 
it. The trouble is that many judges have assumed 
that an "eyeball" witness, who identifies the accused 
as the criminal, is the most reliable of witnesses, 
and, if there are any questions a:out the identification, 
the jurors, in their wisdom, are fully capable 
of determining the credibility of the witness without 
special instructions from the court. Yet cases 
of mistaken identification are not infreauent and 
the problem of misidentification has not.been alleviated. 
We note, for example, a 1979 unreported prosecution 
in Wilmington, Delaware, against Rev. Bernard T. 
Pagano, a Roman Catholic priest, accused of robbing 
six Delaware stores in the winter of 1978. At 
the trial, he was falsely identified by several 
state witnesses as the robber. After the State 
rested its case, the prosecution was dismissed 
on motion of the State because another man confessed 
to the crime. Closer to home is the case of Ronald 
Quick, who was twice tried and convicted of aggravated 
robbery of a liquor store in Hutchinson. At both 
trials two eyewitnesses positively identified defendant 
as the perpetrator of the crime. These two convictions 
were reversed for trial errors in State v. Quick, 
226 Kan. 308, 597 P~2d 1108 (1979) and 229 Kan. 
117, 621 P.2d 997 (1981). The case was dismissed 
by the State during the third trial after another 
man, who looked like the defendant, confessed to 
the crime. 
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The Kansas procedure does provide certain 
safeguards to Prevent the conviction of an innocent 
accused on the·- basis of unreliable eyewitness identification. 
Our trial courts have the power to suonress eyewitness 
testimony, if the eyewitness identification procedure 
rendered the testimony unreliable. Cross-exaI!linatio.n 
and argument by defense counsel afford some protection. 
Unfortunately, these procedures have not solved 
the problem. Able defense counsel have attempted 
to combat unreliable eyewitness identification 
by two additional methods: They have called to 
the witness stand exnert witnesses in the field 
of psychology to testify as to the various factors 
which may cause eyewitness identification to be 
unreliable. They have also requested the trial 
court to give a cautionary instruction stating 
the factors to be considered by the jury in weighing 
the credibility of eyewitness testimony. 635 P.Zd 
at 1241. 
In that case, the trial court refused to allow the defense to 
take either of these actions. Elizabeth Loftus, an expert on 
eyewintess identification, was not allowed to testify and the 
court refused to give the same instruction as appellant requested 
in this case. 4 After a lengthy discussion on the use of expert 
testimony to solve the problems associated with the eyewitness 
testimony, the Kansas court stated, 
After considering these cases and the literature 
on the subject, we have concluded that requiring 
trial courts to admit this tyoe of expert evidence 
is not the answer to the problem. We believe that 
the µroblem can be alleviated by a proper cautionary 
instruction to the jury which sets forth the factors 
to be considered in evaluating eyewitness testimony. 
Such an instruction, coupled with vigorous cross-
examination and persuasive argument by defense 
counsel dealing realistically with the shortcomings 
and trouble spots of the identification process, 
should protect the rights of the defendant and 
at the same time enable the courts to avoid the 
problems involved in the admission of expert testimony 
on this subject. 635 P.2d at 1243. 
4. See footnote l, supra. 
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The instruction that the Kansas court held should be 
given was that framed by the United States Court of Appeal for 
the District of Columbia in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 
552 (D.C. Cir., 1972) . 5 The Telfaire court described the need 
for such an instruction, stating, 
The presumption of innocence that safeguards 
the common law system must be a premise that is 
realized in instruct ion and not mere.ly a promise. 
In pursuance of that objective, we have pointed 
out the importance of and need for a special instruction 
on the key issue of identification, which emphasizes 
to the jury the need for finding that the circumstances 
of the identification are convincing beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This need was voiced in 1942 in McKenzie 
v. United States, (126 F.2d 533] and it has been 
given vitality in our opinions of recent years --· 
following the Supreme Court's 1966 Wade-Gilbert 
[v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 
L.Ed. 2d 1178 (1967)] Stovall [v. Denno, 388 U.S. 
293} trilogy focusing on the very real danger of 
mistaken identification as a threat to justice. 
We refer to our post-Wade opinions in Gregory [v. 
United States, 369 F.2d 185 (1966)] and Macklin 
[v. United States, 409 F.2d 174 (1969)]. These 
opinions sought to take into account the traditional 
reco~nition that identification testimony presents 
special problems of reliability by stressing the 
importance of an identification instruction even 
in- cases meeting the constitutional threshold of 
admissibility. [footnotes omitted] 469 F.2d at 
555. 
In State v. Warren, supra the court held that the model 
instruction from the Telfaire case was more appropriate than 
a general instruction dealing with an identification 
5. This same instruction was cited with approval by Justice 
Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v. Malmrose, 649 
P.2d 56 at 63 (Utah 1982), and as requested by ap~ellant in 
this case. 
-9-
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defense. 6 The Kansas court required the Telfaire instruction 
be given, stating, 
6. The general instruction given in that case provided: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"It is for you to determine the weight and credit to 
be given the testimony of each witness. You have a right to 
use that knowledge and experience which you possess in common 
with men in general in considering the testimony of each witness. 
You also may take the following factors into consideration when 
weighing a witness' testimony: 
(a). The witness' ability and opportunity to observe 
and know the things about which he had testified; 
(b) The clarity and accuracy of the witness' memory; 
(c) The witness' manner and conduct while testifying; 
(d) Any interest the witness may have in the result 
of the trial; and 
(e) The reasonableness of the witness' testimony when 
considered in light of all the evidence in the case; and 
(f) Any bias, interest, prejudice or motive the witness 
may have. 
If you find that any witness has wilfully testified falsely 
concerning any material matter, you have a right to distrust 
the testimony of that witness in other matters, and you ~ay 
reject all or part of the testimony of that witness, or you 
may give it such weight as you think it deserves. You should 
not reject any testimony without cause." 635 P.2d at 1245. 
-10-
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. . we have considered the fact that trial courts 
are often required to determine the admissibility 
of eyewitness testimony where issues of unreliabilitv 
are raised. As pointed out by Chief Justice Schroeder 
in State v. Ponds, 227 Kan. 627, 608 P.2d 946, 
in testing the reliability of identification testimony, 
the five factors mentioned in Neil v. Biggers [490 
U.S. 188 (1972)] should be considered by the trial 
court. If these five factors should be considered 
~n determining the admissibility of the testimony, 
it would seem even more appropriate to require 
the jury to consider the same factors in weighing 
the credibility of t~e eyewitness identification 
testimony. Otherwise the jury might reasonably 
conclude that the admission of the evidence by 
the trial court vouched for its reliability. We 
think it clear that, in order to prevent potential 
injustice, some standards must be provided the 
jury so that the credibility of eyewitness identification 
testimony can be intelligently and fairly weighed. 
The giving of such an instruction will take only 
a couple of minutes in trial time and will be well 
worth it, if some future injustices can be avoided. 
635 P.2d at 1244 [Emphasis by court] 
In Neil v. Biggers, su?ra, the United States Supreme 
Court was addressing the issue of the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification evidence based on a showup procedure. 7 In determining 
the admissibility of the evidence the court initially noted 
that you must consider the totality of the circumstances. The 
court then listed several factors to consider, stating, 
As indicated by our cases, the factors to be considered 
in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification 
include the opportunity of the witness to view 
the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' 
degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness! 
prior description of the criminal, the level of 
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, 
and the length of time between the crime and the 
confrontation. 409 U.S. at 199. 
7. That orocedure involved two detectives walking the petitioner 
past a rape victim. 
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For these same reasons a number of other jurisdictions 
have found that the model instruction f.rom United States v. 
Telfaire, supra, should be given when warranted by the circumstances 
of a particular case. 8 
In Utah, the Telfaire instruction was cited with approval 
by Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v. Malmrose, 
I 
649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982). In that case the majority opinion 
did not squarely address the issue of the requirement of such 
an instruction. The court did not find reversible error in 
the trial court's refusal to give the instruction. The primary 
reason the court gave for that holding was that defense counsel 
failed to take exception to the trial court's refusal to give 
the instruction. The court then stated, "we have not heretofore 
held that such an instruction is required. We believe the giving 
of it should be left to the discretion of the trial court'' 649 
P.2d at 61. Justice Stewart wrote a dissent to that oart of 
the court's opinion and Justice Durham concurred in that dissent. 
8. The Telfaire instruction specifically has either recommended 
or approved for use in numerous jurisdictions as reflected by 
the following cases: United States v. Holly, 502 F.2d 273 (4th 
Cir. 1974); United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 
1975); State v. Beniamin, 363 A. 2d 762 (Conn., 1976); State 
v. Calia, 514 P.2d 354 (Or. App. 1973), cert. den. 417 U.S. 
917 (1974); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E. Zd 889 (Mass. 
1979); United States v. Kavanaugh, 572 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978); 
United States v. Dodge, 538 F.Zd 770 (8th Cir. 1976) cert. den., 
429 U.S. 1099 (l977); United States v. Masterson, 529 F.2d 
30 (9th Cir) cert. den., 426 U.S. 908 (l976); United States 
v. O'Neal, 496 F.Zd 368 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Fernandez. 
456 F.za 638 (2d Cir. 1972); State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St. 2d · 
269, 421 N.E. 2d 157 (1981); State v. Pa!Be, 280 S.E. 2d 72 
CW. Va. 1981); United States v. Cueto, 6 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 
1980); People v. Guzman, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69, 47 Cal. App. 3d 
.'3 8 O ( Ca 1 . An p . , 1915 ) ; St ate v . Mote s , 2 15 S . E . 2 d 19 0 ( S . c . , 
1975); State v. Payne, 280 S.E. 2d 72 ('W. Va. 1981) ~·State v_ 
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982) (Stewart, J. 
-12-
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Previously, this court had decided that it was not reversible 
error to give an instruction similar to that given in State 
v. Warren, supra, State v. Schaffer, 683 P.2d 1185 (Utah 1981). 
It is interesting to note that State v. Schaffer, supra, was 
not even cited in the Malmrose case. In Schaffer the court 
did not say there was no error in refusing to give the instruction, 
but rather, the court reasoned that because other general instructions 
on credibility and burden of proof were given, the jury was 
adequately advised on what the law was. Secondly, the court 
noted that there were two eyewitnesses who had abundant opportunity 
to observe the defendant, thus alleviating any prejudice. The 
court concluded that the refusal to give the instruction did 
not constitute "reversible error" [emphasis added] 638 P.2d 
at 1187. 
Similarly in State v. Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Ut. 1980) 
the issue of the refusal to give an instruction on eyewitness 
identification was raised. 9 With respect to that issue this 
court stated; 
A criminal defendant is entitled to have a jury 
instructed on his theory of the case if there is 
any substantial evidence to justify such an instruction. 
Where, however, the requested instruction is denied, 
no prejudicial error occurs if it appears that 
the giving of the requested instruction would not 
have affected the outcome of the trial. Moreover, 
a defendant is not entitled to an instruction which 
is redundant or renetitive of nrinciples enunciated 
in other instructi~ns given to~the jury. The principal 
points of defendant's proposed instruction dealt 
with the State's burden of proof and the factors 
to consider in weighing the.testimony of an eyewitness. 
9. The text of the instruction was not included in the oninion. 
-13-
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All of these factors were adequately dealt with 
in other instructions presented to the jury by 
the trial court. As a-result, we cannot agree 
that the denial of the oroposed instruction constituted 
reversible error. [footnote omitted] 622 P.2d 
at 35 9. 
The general conclusions that can be reached about these 
cases are: First of all, this court has never said that such 
an instruction is improper and should not be given. Secondly, 
the court has clearly implied that under certain circumstances 
the identity instruction would be proper. Finally, the court 
in all of these cases spoke in terms of no reversible error 
indicating that due to the nature of the cases, even though 
there may have been error, there was no prejudice to the appellants. 
Several other principles of Utah law which were dealt 
with only in passing or not mentioned at all in those cases 
must be discussed here. Under the law of Utah a criminal defendant 
is entitled to have his theory of the case presented to the 
jury in the form of written instructions, State v. Stenbeck, 
78 U. 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931), State v. Mccumber, supra. With 
respect to defenses, a criminal defendant is entitled to have 
the jury instructed that the defense need only raise a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Ut. 1977); State v. Torres, 
619 P.2d 694 (Ut. 1980); and State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Ut. 
1981). The mere fact that the court gave general instructions 
. 
on the presumption of innocence and burden of proof does not 
alleviate the prejudice in refusing to instruct the jury with 
respect to the defendant's burden in establishing his defense. 
This court has held that a jury need not 
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. . . go through such a tortuous process when 
that result could have been achieved by giving 
the defendant's requested instruction, or one of 
that substance." State v. Torres, supra at 696. 
In this case there was no instruction given which explained 
to the jury what the defense was, nor was there any instruction 
given which explained to the jury what the burden of oroof was with 
respect to a defense. The only instruction that was submitted 
on these issues was that which is the subject of this appeal.lo 
Consequently, it was error not to give an instruction explaining 
to the jury what the defense was, and relating that portion 
of the evidence to the reasonable doubt standard. The policies 
that support the giving of the Telfaire model instruction, discussed 
above, are substantial and compelling. That instruction is 
clearly a necessary and proper one and it was error to refuse 
to give it to the jury. 
The error in refusing to give the instruction an identification 
was preiudicial requiring a new trial. A criminal conviction 
must be reversed if there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
verdict would be different if the requested instruction had 
been given. State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Ut. 1977). The 
only issue at trial was the identification of the defendant 
as the perpetrator of the aggravated robbery. The victim never 
identified the appellant in court as the person who committed 
the offense. (T. 9-30). The only identification that was made 
of the appellant was from a photographic array that the victim 
10. See footnote 1, supra. 
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observed some twelve days after the commission of the crime. 
(T. 16, 36-38). There was no other evidence to corroborate 
the identification made by Mr. Palmer. (See, United States 
v. Cueto, supra; State v. Payne, supra). The initial description 
of the robber given by Mr. Palmer was very general. He was 
able to describe the clothing, height and weight of the perpetrator. 
The only distinguishing features he noticed was that of a moustache 
and dark brown, shoulder length hair. (T. 33) Mr. Palmer's 
opportunity to observe the robber was very limited. He stated 
that the robber asked for change for a dollar prior to the offense 
(T. 11). That transaction as well as the opportunity to observe 
lasted only a matter of seconds. (T. 19) The robber then reapproached 
the window and put the gun through the hole in the window at 
face level where he was able to observe only the gun. (T. 22) 
The fact that Mr. Palmer was able to observe only the gun is 
born out by the detailed description that he gave of it. He 
stated that it was a .22 caliber revolver with an eight inch 
barrell. (T. 11) Finally, it is important to note that the 
officer who observed Mr. Palmer immediately after the robbery 
found him to be obviously upset and very badly scared (T. 34). 
It is hard to imagine a case where there would be a greater 
need for an instruction describing what eyewitness identification 
evidence is, how it is to be evaluated, and the burden of proof 
it must meet. In rejecting this instruction requested by the 
appellant the trial court noted on the instruction "not given 
use as argument". (R. 66) However. the court also instructed 
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the jury that "statements of counsel are not evidence and should 
not be considered as such by you". CR. 34) There were obvious 
problems in this case with respect to the opportunity to observe, 
the potential for suggestive procedures with photogra?hic identification, 
the state of mind of Mr. Palmer at the time the observations 
were made and the complete absence of any evidence to corroborate 
the identification of the defendant. An instruction on how 
to evaluate eyewitness identification evidence and how to weigh 
the evidence was necessary to inform the jury of these problems. 
If the instruction had been given, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the verdict would have been different. Consequently, the 
error was prejudicial and a new trial should be ordered. 
CONCLUSION 
The only evidence connecting the appellant to the aggravated 
robbery which is the subject of this case, was the identification 
made of the appellant from a photographic array. The dangers 
inherent in eyewitness identification evidence have been recognized 
for many years. One of the methods that courts have required 
to be used to eliminate some of these dangers is to give the 
jury an instruction that describes the nature of identification 
evidence, factors to be considered in weighing such evidence 
and the burden of proof that evidence must meet. Such an instruction 
was requested here and the refusal to give it was prejudicial 
error requiring a new trial. 11 
I 
of(!Je)ember, 198r,J /· .. J ,· / ___  1~ /· /'i'/ -r ~~/vL-1«5 
G. ~METOS~ ' 
DATED this day 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
day of December, 1982. 
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